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Anticipatory Imagination in Aging 
Revolt and Resignation in Modern Day France 
Jill Drouillard 
Université Paris-Sorbonne IV 
“Rien n’arrive ni comme on l’espère, ni comme on le craint. Nothing really 
happens as we hope it will, nor as we fear it will.”1 Améry appropriates this 
quote of Proust to highlight how our imaginative powers can never 
approach its reality during an extreme event. This failure of what he coins 
our anticipatory imagination is depicted in his phenomenological account of 
torture, an event whose extremity is later compared to another embodied 
experience: that of aging. Equating torture with aging may seem shocking to 
some, and Améry was critiqued for suggesting such a parallel, particularly 
since he narrates a lived experience with the latter at the mere age of fifty-
five. He revisits this critique in the preface to the fourth edition of On Aging: 
Revolt and Resignation where he states: 
Today as much as yesterday I think that society has to undertake 
everything to relieve old and aging persons of their unpleasant 
destiny. And at the same time I stick to my position that all high-
minded and reverential efforts in this direction, though indeed 
capable of being somewhat soothing- are still not capable of 
changing anything fundamental about the tragic hardship of aging. 
[Améry’s emphasis]2 
The “today” of society that Améry referenced was 1977. But what about 
today? Is Améry correct in projecting that despite our best efforts nothing 
fundamental can change the quite unbearable experience of aging? Are 
attempts to aid the aging complicit in a “vile dupery” that ends in 
“metaphorically empty” phrases such as “rest in peace”?3 I would like to 
pose these questions in the wake of a heated debate in France regarding the 
legality of assisted suicide for aging persons (Améry took his own life and 
sees suicide as an acceptable form of revolt and resignation, the only 
authentic choices left to the aging). Thus, this paper seeks to not only dissect 
his account of aging (and the failure of anticipatory imagination in futural 
J i l l  D r o u i l l a r d  |  5 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.787 
projections of it) but to ask whether his philosophy could be read alongside 
current French thinkers to better assess comment mourir dans la dignité. 
 
A Historical Context 
Though this article is not an empirical study on current statistics regarding 
suicide rates among aging persons, I do find it necessary to reference some 
figures for the sake of placing Améry’s work within a modern context. 
Almost fifty years later his work is still not only relevant for approaching the 
topic, but his existential and phenomenological take on the matter is perhaps 
the only aspect missing from current debates on the legality of assisted 
suicide. Each year, around 3000 citizens over the age of 65 take their own life 
in France, a figure not to be neglected insofar as aging persons make up 20% 
of the population yet account for 28% of all suicides.4 This ever-increasing 
number gained a lot of media attention in 2013 after two octogenarian 
couples opted to take their lives within days of each other. One couple, 
Georgette and Bernard, referred to as “les amants de Lutetia”, chose to die 
together via asphyxiation by placing plastic bags over their heads. This 
gesture of double suicide was accompanied by a letter that expressed their 
indignation at not being able to die with dignity; French law deprived them 
of une mort douce. Georgette laments, “La loi interdit l'accès à toute pastille 
létale qui permettrait une mort douce. (…) De quel droit contraindre (une 
personne) à des pratiques cruelles quand elle veut sereinement quitter la 
vie?”5 Here I should acknowledge the crudeness of the above statement, 
“[They] chose to die together via asphyxiation by placing plastic bags over 
their heads.” Noticing the vulgarity and directness of this statement, I at first 
tried to rephrase it, though there is nothing subtle about their actions. Their 
death was not soft. The French media has perhaps done this couple injustice 
by turning their act of revolt into a mere love story. Describing the way in 
which the couple was found dead, an article quotes a chanson by Edith Piaf, 
"On les a trouvés se tenant par la main, les yeux fermés vers d'autres 
matins".6 Are there other mornings to come? Does romanticizing their act of 
rebellion act as a consolation for the rest of society? Do we look at their 
political act with nostalgia so as to assuage our own fears of aging? Of 
course, the fact that they were lovers is not negligible, but it ignores the real 
significance of their protest. Recounting the story that they were lovers found 
dead, hand in hand, dismisses the point that their deliberate act to die in that 
hotel, on that day, together, was the last authentic choice made by them.  
According to Améry, death does not save the future as a dimension of 
time. Death is “my being taken out of space in the most literal meaning of 
the word: my an-nihilation”.7 There are no more mornings to come. To 
speak of other mornings is as absurd as speaking of aging as the “autumn of 
life”. Améry exclaims, “We speak of the ‘autumn of life’- charming 
metaphor! Autumn? After autumn comes a winter, after that once again a 
5 8  |  A n t i c i p a t o r y  I m a g i n a t i o n  i n  A g i n g  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.787 
spring and then a summer. For the aging, however, the autumn of life is the 
last autumn and therefore not an autumn at all”.8 In the face of this final 
harvest, few possibilities are left. Yet, this is not because the elderly are 
running out of time. Here is perhaps Améry’s greatest perspicacity on the 
experience of aging: the future is not time, but world and space. He notes,  
Those who believe they have what is called ‘time’ in front of them, 
know that they are truly destined to step out into space, to 
externalize themselves. Those who have life within them, i.e. 
authentic time, have to be internally satisfied with the deceptive 
magic of memory. What is in store for them is death [Améry’s 
Emphasis].9 
Thus, is this last autumn just a being-towards-death? Yes and no, he replies, 
with an emphasis on the “no”. One cannot wait for something that is 
nothing. Waiting for death becomes as absurd as waiting for Godot. In this 
sense, choosing to lay a hand on oneself10 is one of the only authentic choices 
left when faced with the imminence of death (of nothing). Thus, for les 
amants de Lutetia, their last actions were imbued with much significance. 
They chose their time, space, and company in death. These were possibilities 
still left in the world, a world increasingly retracting from them. The hotel 
Lutetia was symbolically chosen, because after the war, it had been a safe 
haven for those returning after deportation, including Georgette’s father 
with whom she was reunited there.  How important is it for us to choose our 
last place of dwelling? Damien Le Guay, philosopher and president of the 
comité national d’éthique du funéraire, opposes the legalization of assisted 
suicide, noting that the majority of France is only in favor of this practice 
because of their fear of dying in hospitals. He states:  
Encore faut-il savoir pourquoi les Français veulent l'euthanasie? 
Avant tout, ils craignent l'hôpital! Ils n'ont pas envie de mourir 
seuls, abandonnés, face à des machines, réduits à leurs maladies et 
incapables de comprendre la logique toute puissante des 
médecins(…)Aujourd'hui 70% des Français meurent dans une 
structure hospitalière, parfois dans des conditions indignes et de 
temps à autre, dans des circonstances sordides.11 
Would the problem of “le mal mourir” in France be resolved if those at the 
end of their days were able to die at home? But, what does that home look 
like? Le Guay notes, “Au début des années 1960, 70 % des français mourraient 
chez eux”. However, today, aging persons are increasingly put in retirement 
homes (les maisons de retraite). Retraite: to retract oneself from an active life. 
Or, as Amery would have it- retraite: to have the world retract from you.    
Rather than quietly watch their world dissipate, Georgette and 
Bernard decided to take matters into their own hands. They wanted to die 
an intimate death together, rather than be surrounded by unknown nurses 
and alienating machines. Their decision to die was resolute, and they made 
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the circumstances of their death matter. Instead of passively waiting to die, 
was their voluntary death their last act as autonomous agents? This question 
is not meant to solicit a reply in favor of suicide. It is, however, an 
interrogation that seeks to think about the experience of aging and the option 
of assisted suicide, all the while knowing that a clear understanding of both is 
impossible. As Barlow emphasizes in his translator’s introduction to On 
Aging, “[Améry] is not trying to convert or teach morality. The key to 
Améry’s book is his determination to look at the phenomenon of aging 
without blinking.” Here, I think of Nietzsche, “’We have invented 
happiness’, say the last men, and they blink.”12 Améry does not want us to 
take solace in a false community of happiness, but rather to look at the 
inevitable experience of aging dead on. We place the aging in retirement 
homes, and then, we blink. We incite them to take part in activities that 
serve no purpose but act as distraction, and then, we blink. What is 
disconcerting is that, for the most part, those who are dealing with current 
legislation to increase the happiness of the aging, and those who are creating 
the rhetoric that defines what it means to die in dignity are not themselves 
aging. Amery reiterates à plusieurs reprises that, existentially, one can never 
know what aging is like until one experiences it.  Thus, how can we 
anticipate this experience before its occurrence? The act of imagination is 
paramount to individual freedom insofar as futural projection allows one to 
anticipate a potential experience and then choose from different possibilities 
of action. How can we appropriately anticipate aging, a condition that 
certainly ends in death, which is no possibility at all? How can we possibly 
imagine our reaction in the face of such annihilation? Anticipatory 
imagination is not possible when projecting the event of aging, “but not 
because the occurrence, as one says, perhaps ‘goes beyond the imagination’ 
(it is not a quantitative question), but because it is reality and not 
phantasy.”13 The failure of anticipation is key here. Michèle Delauney, 
minister responsible for the well being of aging persons, “a pour mission de 
préparer une loi ‘d’anticipation et d’accompagnement de la perte d’autonomie.’”14 
How can one anticipate the loss of autonomy as experienced by an(other)? 
Here, our imagination fails. Now, I do not wish to insinuate that we should 
stop trying to foresee a better future for the aging. However, I do think 
Améry’s insights, developed after listening to the stories and experiences of 
the elderly can help us here. We should particularly revisit the decision of 
aging persons to take their own lives within a current French climate that 
continues to criminalize assisted suicide.  
In On Suicide, Améry claims that turning thoughts of suicide into a 
sign of illness that can be cured with psychology fails to recognize the value 
in an individual’s own interpretation of his/her life. Emphasizing the 
difficulty inherent in trying to understand one’s motivation in committing 
suicide, he states, “One is trying to understand reasons expressed in a 
language that is individually subjective.” 15 How can an aging person 
contemplating suicide verbalize thoughts that are intersubjectively 
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incoherent? Language fails in trying to convey an experience that is most 
one’s own. An individual’s thoughts thus become translated into medical 
terms that psychology can diagnose. Rather than approach the issue of aging 
without blinking, the absurdity and contradictory nature of the experience is 
reformulated into wording that the rational mind can digest. “We have 
invented happiness”, say the psychologists, and they blink. Testimonies 
from experts appear to diagnose the condition of aging as one of depression 
for which a cure could be found within the medical community. "Le suicide 
des personnes âgées est quasiment à 100% lié à la depression [emphasis 
mine]"16, states Marie-Claude Frénisy, a psychologist in Dijon. Quasiment? 
That’s a pretty bold statement. Geriatrician Olivier Henry estimates that 
“40% des personnes qui passent dans son cabinet prennent des anti-
dépresseurs…La dépression est l'une des pathologies les plus fréquentes à 
cet âge-là. L'avenir est limité, l'horizon se rétrécit." The future is limited. The 
horizon is retracting. In the face of these two brutal facts about aging, is the 
solution medication? Is giving antidepressants to aging persons the solution 
to their ever-increasing loss of autonomy? Is this not just a case of the non-
aging imposing their will upon the aging? Is it our way of saying that the 
value they ascribe to their lives is not compatible with the rest of the world’s 
instinct to live? Why do we seek to keep the aging in a world that is 
continually retracting from them?  
Retraite: the fact of having retracted oneself from an active life. Does 
one retire, or does the world retire from them? What does that mean to 
retract oneself from an active life? Are our activities not central to our 
formation of self? Upon meeting someone for the first time, the defining 
question is “What do you do?” This inquiry is largely aimed at assessing 
one’s vocational activity, but extends to other questions about one’s 
hobbies/interests (basically, what one does out there in the world). In their 
book Philosophie des âges de la vie, Éric Deschavanne and Pierre-Henri 
Tavoillot address the need to rethink the different ages of a person’s life 
within a modern historical context where certain markers of maturity are no 
longer clearly delimited. The prolongation of our expected life span poses 
important economical questions, concerning l’emploi des seniors, and if and 
how we should in turn prolong the age of retirement. In addition to 
burgeoning financial problems, a reconfiguration of retirement in France 
raises questions of a political and social nature. Deschavanne and Tavoillot 
assert, “La retraite à 60 ans apparut comme une grande victoire sociale, 
l’aboutissement historique des grandes luttes des XIXe et XXe siècles.”17 
Once heralded as a victory for allowing a tranquil retirement after having 
paid one’s dues as a contributing member of society, the arbitrariness of this 
age now becomes salient as “pour le dire clairement, à 60 ans, l’individu 
n’est pas fini.”18 One can expect to live another 20 years after retirement. The 
logistics of financial planning aside, how is one supposed to occupy one’s 
space in the world for an additional two decades? Deschavanne and 
Tavoillot call for the necessity of rethinking a politics of aging, one that 
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accounts for the changing nature of retirement. This stage of one’s life is no 
longer about financial compensation for services rendered but is an issue of 
épanouissement personnel. How can society assist in the personal development 
and well being of aging persons? Comment bien vieillir? One of the final 
sections of Philosophie des âges, “Aider l’entrée dans la vieillesse”, suggests that 
current debates on how to “age better” focus on the continuation of 
maintaining some form of activity. They state that whether or not the issue 
at hand is economical or social, the conviction remains that: 
le meilleur moyen d’entrer dans la vieillesse et de la vivre au mieux 
consiste à maintenir un lien avec une activité. L’activité peut être 
salariée, bénévole, associative ou même de loisir, mais elle reste la 
garantie du ‘bien vieillir’ [Deschavanne and Tavoillot’s emphasis].19 
Is remaining active the key to bien vieillir? Or, does it just seem that way to 
others occupying the world?  Claude and Odette is another octogenarian 
couple that decided to take their own lives; like Georgette and Bernard, they 
left a letter explaining the motivating factors behind their decision. During 
interviews conducted after the incident, a neighbor commented, “Ils allaient 
au marché et au théâtre,” perhaps hinting at the incredulity of their actions. 
How could this happy active couple do such a thing? A key term, floating 
around in ethical debates that try to understand the volition of assisted 
suicide is the notion of mal mourir. Reacting to the actions of these two 
octogenarian couples, Noëlle Chatelet states, “Je pense que la mort 
s'apprend. Seulement on a du mal à le faire dans un pays où elle est déniée. 
Ce qui fait peur aux personnes de cet âge, ce n'est pas de mourir mais de mal 
mourir."20 But, what does it mean to say that someone dies poorly? What 
criteria would have to be met to ensure that someone dies better? Chatelet, 
whose own mother Mireille Jospin a choisi la mort, emphasizes the 
importance of being able to choose the conditions under which we depart 
from this world. As previously enunciated, Georgette and Bernard, as well 
as Claude and Odette, made the circumstances of their death matter. They 
decided the time, place, and company of their death, their only regret being 
the inaccessibility to une mort douce, because of current legislation regarding 
assisted suicide in France. Chatelet emphasizes the significance of ceremony 
in the arrangement of their deaths:  
C'est ce qui rend la chose si belle. C'est une cérémonie pour eux-
mêmes qui met en scène leur amour pour toujours. Ce sont des 
amants jusqu'au bout. C'est une mise en scène pour nous aussi, la 
société et le législateur, qui veut dire : ‘aider à partir ceux qui 
veulent partir’21 
Chatelet’s statement is important, because while she recognizes their love 
for each other and their choice to create a scene that “immortalizes” it, she 
also notices the political significance of their actions. Should the French 
government help those who wish to leave (the world)? Is the option of 
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assisted suicide an appropriate solution to le mal mourir? Would having the 
possibility to choose une mort douce help those who are aging better cope 
with their retraction from the world? Even though one does not fully 
appreciate the act of aging until its occurrence, would the anticipation of this 
event be met with less apprehension, if the potentiality for a softer, chosen 
death were possible? Nietzsche states, “The thought of suicide is a powerful 
comfort: it helps one through many a dreadful night.”22 Would the option of 
assisted suicide be an even more powerful comfort, helping those through 
the process of aging? An article titled Se suicider au grand âge : l’ultime recours 
à une vieillesse déchue? by Arnaud Campéon suggests that it would. Here, he 
elucidates on l’idéation suicidaire par anticipation in which aging persons 
(belonging to one of two groups) project themselves into a future where 
their conditions of living are deemed no longer acceptable. While the first 
group of people contemplates suicide in anticipation of an eventual senility, 
the second group envisages a future where their disconnection from the 
world and others negates the value that they ascribe to their existence. In 
reference to the experience of the first group, Campéon states: 
Elle est le fait d’individus qui, de par leur trajectoire de vie ou leur 
connaissance, ne parviennent pas à dépasser l’image de la grande 
vieillesse comme celle d’un « naufrage sénile ». Il s’agit 
généralement d’individus qui ne présentent pas encore 
d’incapacités sévères mais qui ont la conviction qu’à partir d’un 
certain âge (variable selon les personnes) ou d’un degré de 
handicap, le risque de mal vieillir est trop important.23 
In reference to the second group, he asserts: 
L’appréhension du mal-vieillir, c’est aussi l’appréhension de vieillir 
seul et d’être ainsi privé, par les circonstances de la vie, d’autrui 
significatifs qui peuplent leur univers personnel, le colorent et le 
réchauffent. Autrement dit, d’être privés de ceux et celles qui 
confirment leur existence et les rassurent sur leur utilité, leur 
valeur.24 
In these two instances, the aging imagine a world in which they no longer 
wish to live. As previously stated, the act of imagination is paramount to 
individual freedom insofar as futural projection allows one to anticipate a 
potential experience and then choose from different possibilities of action. 
Yet, our anticipatory imagination fails when projecting an extreme event 
such as aging in that it can only be appreciated as an actual embodied 
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The First Blow 
Existentially speaking, one never experiences aging until one is aging. This 
moment of recognition, the instant when one realizes they are, in fact, living 
this phenomenon, Améry discusses as a blow: 
But without being noticed, the temporal weights have now become 
distributed in a new way. Grass has been growing over the entire 
past, which suddenly appears now to be leveled, no longer having 
any time value at all. Until- one usually discovers it with a blow- the 
displacement of the quanta of the past, which has continued to take 
place under the grass, becomes manifest…[emphasis mine] 25 
We do not become aware of time as experienced by the aging, until we feel 
the first blow. We think we can anticipate such an event: the bodily 
degradation, the loss of autonomy, the dependence on others, etc. Though 
such language would indicate a grasp or understanding of what it means to 
age, such grammar fails us. Améry asserts: “The time of which we become 
aware in aging is not only something we cannot grasp; it is also filled with 
absurdity, a bitter mockery of every intellectual precision we have aspired 
to.”26 It is trying to organize that which resists order. Mentally speaking, 
dates and events are not so easily classified. Physically speaking, after the 
first blow, the body in its alienation from the world becomes closer to us, so 
that we become in a sense body. Amery recounts the story of A., a woman 
who humorously refers to herself as Xanthippe (“yellow horse”), because of 
the yellow nodes of skin that afflict her face due to old age. She looks in the 
mirror and sees herself as a stranger. This is not the face she chose. It is 
unrecognizable to her former self.  However, as A. increasingly looks into 
the mirror and submits herself to the regimented routine of applying eye 
cream to no avail, she forms a narcissistic relationship to her body, and 
becomes closer to herself. In this sense, a new ego is forged. Another 
personage, also referred to as A., complains, “You poor leg, you’ve been 
carrying me through a world of streets, mountains, cobblestones, and gas 
pedals! Now you’ve been taken from time and work and can’t do anymore; 
you’re both tired, just like my heart that won’t allow me anymore to go 
upstairs two steps at a time [emphasis mine].”27 We only become acquainted 
with our body [carrying me, my heart, allow me] in aging. Surely a younger 
person becomes aware of one’s appendages after an accident that requires 
repair, but repair is possible. For the aging, there is no remedy. Amery 
explicates this reconnaissance with one’s body, 
We only discover our body and pain in aging. Especially aging, in 
the way it heaps its burdens upon us more frequently every day. 
Since in its suffering it no longer transcends itself to dissolve in 
world and space, this body is just as much a true ego as the 
stratified time the aging have built up inside themselves.28 
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Understanding this new ego formation is important to trying to 
understand an aging person’s opting for suicide. We often hear that A. 
wasn’t in his right mind when the decision took place. Or, that A. wasn’t 
herself. But, what is this fixed identity we appeal to? Améry speaks of the 
dialectical turn that takes place in aging as it moves towards nothingness. 
Our body not only becomes more ours, but it becomes more authentic in its 
internalization of time (this body is just as much a true ego as the stratified time 
the aging have built up inside themselves). The new aging body, while alienated 
from its former self, develops a new ego as it tries to reconcile its new 
balancing of world and time. This body retracts from the world, a world 
whose language and culture becomes increasingly incomprehensible, yet 
still attempts to view itself through the eyes of such a society (Yes, the world 
is retracting, but insofar as this body continues to exist it is still a being-in-
the-world and necessarily a being-with-others). As its sense of world 
diminishes, its sense of time becomes heightened, and it tries to reformulate 
its ego in the face of this new temporal understanding. Améry notes, “It is 
true that the ego we carry with us is a creation of society (…) Still, in the act 
of remembering, we have remodeled and newly interpreted our social ego 
[Améry’s Emphasis].”29 There is no true identity, in this sense. Our ego can be 
remolded and newly elucidated. According to Améry, if it is, indeed, 
possible to speak of an ego, such an identity can only be forged in its 
removal from the world. For those that still have space in front of them, the 
formation of an authentic ego is impossible, insofar as their sense of self is 
constituted through the lens of others. These societal ego formations are 
consummated through idle talk, everyday parlance that fails to communicate 
lived temporal experiences; an intimate understanding of time becomes 
indescribable, as “we have to bring in metaphors from the world of space, if 
we are to say anything at all about it.”30  Améry speaks of yet another A., a 
man confined to a dark solitary cell for six months. A.’s spatial confinement, 
his small cell and more importantly, his withdrawal from the world, work to 
increase his lived experience of time.   Where the world retracts, a sense of 
time will be heightened. Améry reflects on our existence in space and time, 
noting, 
That by being-in-the-world, by being cast into the world of space, 
an ego is not yet possible, an ego will only come into being in the 
struggle against the world and in gentle play with it; that by the 
time an ego has consolidated itself in one’s mind, it is time run by, 
time without world, and this shadowy ego-in-time has the 
emotional quality of inert mourning and resignation.31 
Is this newly devised ego, the product of temporal/spatial redistribution no 
longer A.?  When we say that A. wasn’t herself before the leap (a term Amery 
uses to describe one’s disposition right before choosing suicide), what do we 
mean? Could it be that suicide was an authentic choice according to A’s 
reformulated ego? Can we really try to anticipate and compensate for an 
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aging person’s loss of autonomy (as per the mission of minister Delauney)? 
If Améry is correct in postulating that an authentic ego can only be 
consummated with a retraction from the world, and thus inversely, a 
manifestation of inner time, is what the aging person is experiencing really a 
loss of autonomy? On the one hand, yes, in the sense that the bodily 
degradation of the elderly necessitates dependence on others. However, 
insofar as those persons still capable of spatial projection intersubjectively 
communicate via idle talk, any real individual will to action is not possible. 
Those externalized in space become passive in their capacity to act 
autonomously, whereas those experiencing the internalization of time have 
a better understanding of what it means to make an authentic decision. Yet, 
because the “reasoning” behind an aging person’s choice to commit suicide 
cannot be understood intersubjectively, in that communication relies on 
some sort of rational symbolic grammatical system, such a decision, though 
irrational by definition, is chalked up to a medical anomaly: depression.  
Améry elucidates this point in the following anecdote, 
He was dragged to a neurologist who was a friend of his and who 
wisely said, ‘Don’t you realize that things like domestic quarrels, 
tears, and reconciliations belong to vaudeville?’ A trifle had 
escaped the doctor: what is to be called vaudeville and what is to be 
called tragedy is decided by the author.32 
The situation vécue before the leap resists communication. The subject cannot 
be understood intersubjectively. Is this, in part, why Améry chooses to 
recount the experiences of the aging through the voice of A.? Everyone is A., 
yet A. is no one. With his first narration, he explains: 
We’ll call this aging man by the cipher ‘A.,’ just as we’ll designate 
all those of his comrades in destiny whom from time to time we 
intend to introduce to our considerations. A: both the most 
mathematical and abstract specification imaginable and one that 
leaves to my readers the most extensive free space to think 
imaginatively and concretely.33 
A. as “the most mathematical” symbol is objective and thus devoid of 
subjectivity. Yet, A. is “the most abstract specification imaginable” in that it 
allows the audience free space to envisage A. as a concrete subject. A. is 
abstract, yet our mental faculties resist total abstraction as we can only 
imagine him/her in the form of some solidified identity (we attempt to place 
order amid disorder). A., as both abstract and concrete, preserves the tension 
between the subject and its incommensurability with the intersubjective. We 
can imagine what A. is going through, yet such an experience remains 
incommunicable. We can anticipate what it will be like to one day age like 
A., but our imaginative powers will never be able to properly project an 
event such as aging. Améry invites us to participate in a thought experiment 
of anticipatory imagination that he knows will fail.  
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As previously noted, Amery coins the term anticipatory imagination in 
his essay On Torture where he provides a phenomenological account of this 
embodied event. Torture is described as an event so extreme that our 
imaginative powers can never approach the reality of its actual occurrence. 
We also noted that the acuteness of such an event was made comparable to 
that of another embodied experience: that of aging. The parallel made 
between the two is noted, though not without a sense of uneasiness. One can 
question whether the experience of torture, particularly when taken within a 
genocidal context, can be equated with that of old age. Though, it has been 
suggested that perhaps Améry would not have viewed aging (and its 
approaching of certain death) as a form of torture had he not, in fact, been 
the victim of torture (and its imminent threats of death).34 That is, in having 
been tortured, the precariousness of his life was constantly reinforced; he 
could, at any moment, die. After undergoing such an experience, how could 
he live with the certainty of death that old age necessarily brings? The 
tortured person knows he could die, but the aging person has the embodied 
knowledge that he will die. Though one could continue to speculate on the 
correlation between aging and torture and whether it is a valid one, what I 
seek to do here is elucidate on how Amery asserts that our anticipatory 
imagination fails us in the face of these two extreme events.  
Like aging, the realization of torture comes with the first blow. Upon 
being captured by the Third Reich, Amery states: 
I believed to anticipate what was in store for me…so many reports 
by former Gestapo prisoners had reached my ears that I thought 
there could be nothing new for me in this area…Thus it was written 
and thus it would happen…I knew what was coming and they 
could count on my consent to it. But does one really know?35 
He further emphasizes his phenomenological ignorance before the first blow 
by describing his interrogation by the police. While questioning him for 
information, they cautioned, “If you don’t confess, then it’s off to 
Breendonk, and you know what that means,” to which Amery pondered “I 
knew, and I didn’t know (…) And suddenly I felt- the first blow” [Améry’s 
emphasis].36 The first blow makes one cognizant that a border violation is 
taking place between one’s own body and the external world. Améry asserts, 
“The boundaries of my body are also the boundaries of my self. My skin 
surface shields me against the external world. If I am to have trust, I must 
feel on it only what I want to feel [Améry’s emphasis].”37 This emphasis on the 
“want” highlights the non-consensual and non-reciprocal act of the first 
blow, an act that Améry likens to a rape. Not only is the first blow uninvited 
and unwelcome, but resistance is not possible. One cannot defend oneself in 
the instance of this coup, nor can one look elsewhere for assistance: 
The first blow brings home to the prisoner that he is helpless, and 
thus it already contains in the bud everything that is to come. One 
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may have known about torture and death in the cell, without such 
knowledge having possessed the hue of life; but upon the first blow 
they are anticipated as real possibilities, yes, as certainties. [Améry’s 
emphasis]38 
With the first blow, one realizes the limit of one’s imagination in anticipating 
an event so extreme, and becomes faced with the “existential consummation 
of destruction altogether”39 as a reality. In this moment, one is rendered 
helpless, as he gains the embodied knowledge that no one will come to his 
aid. Knowing as a certainty that no one will come to your assistance is 
detrimental to the phenomenon of torture. Améry suggests,  
The expectation of help is as much a constitutional psychic element 
as is the struggle for existence. Just a moment, the mother says to 
her child who is moaning from pain, a hot-water bottle, a cup of tea 
is coming right away, we won’t let you suffer so! I’ll prescribe you 
a medicine, the doctor assures it will help you. Even on the 
battlefield, the Red Cross ambulances find their way to the 
wounded man. In almost all situations in life where there is bodily 
injury there is also the expectation of help; the former is 
compensated by the latter. But with the first blow from a 
policeman’s fist, against which there can be no defense and which 
no helping hand will ward off, a part of our life ends and it can 
never again be revived.40 
In situations of discomfort or pain, we are used to anticipating some 
form of help. When no one comes to our aid, and when external forces 
continue to deny our will, we lose “our trust in the world.”41 If I am to have 
trust, I must feel on [my body] only what I want to feel. This violation from 
which neither help nor resistance is possible reduces the self to flesh, to a 
pure body. Améry asserts, “Only in torture does the transformation of the 
person into flesh become complete. Frail in the face of violence, yelling out 
in pain, awaiting no help, capable of no resistance, the tortured person is 
only a body, and nothing else beside that.”42 Is this not the fear of the aging 
person, confronted by an imminent death from which no assistance is 
possible? There is no escape from the “ultimate disability, after which no 
tissue renews itself anymore.”43 Améry dissects the saying “time heals all 
wounds”, insisting that time does no such thing insofar as this wound said 
to heal no longer exists. He explains: “The wound has become a scab, taken 
care of by time, and is itself not time any more nor even a spatial exterior, 
but simply a part of the body, no longer noticing itself and belonging to the 
world.”44 Those capable of receiving help and healing from their affliction 
still have trust in the world, a world that is open to them. The aging become 
more aware of time as the world pulls away from them. The incapacity to 
resist this retraction reduces the aging body to a pure body (a body with 
built-up time). The capacity to mediate on time as time is only possible for 
those who are closed off from the world and its potentialities.  Améry 
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reiterates this point when he speaks of A., a man we previously mentioned, 
who finds himself confined to a solitary cell for six months. Whether or not 
A. is Améry is open to speculation. For even though Amery was not aging at 
the time of his torture, he does make the point that one who is tortured stays 
tortured. Thus, it is probable that Améry’s evoking A. in On Aging is not 
only a relived account of his experience but a direct link between the event 
of torture and aging (in that both extreme events lend themselves to an acute 
understanding of time). Améry asserts: “[A.] was already half removed from 
space, and he discovered at that point, once and for all, that lived time in 
certain circumstances has to compensate for world.”45 As the aging body 
becomes more of a worldless ego, and as the body no longer mirrors and 
defines itself in terms of a world (insofar as this world is increasingly 
retracting), the ego becomes closer to its flesh and its embodiment of 
gathered up memories. Though alienated from its former conception of self, 
a new self is formed that is increasingly aware of its physical-temporal 
condition.  Akin to the body that is subject to torture, in that resistance to 
external forces is not possible, the aging person is likewise unable to call for 
assistance. We cannot crawl out of our wrinkles or run away from our 
weakening bones. Améry explains: 
This body which is no longer the mediator between the world and 
us, but cuts us off from world and space with its heavy breathing, 
painful legs, and the arthritically plagued articulation of our bones, 
is becoming our prison, but also our last shelter. It is becoming 
what remains, a shell- the phrase ‘mortal remains’ probably 
suggests itself to every aging person who reflects upon what is 
happening to his or her body- but becoming in the same breath of 
thought the most extreme human authenticity, since in the end it is 
what is finally right. [Amery’s emphasis]46 
 Améry’s emphasis on the it here further points to A’s status as a non-
subject. A. is devoid of subjectivity as it no longer participates in a world 
(with others) that is necessary for one’s formation of self. Yet, at the same 
time, A’s transformation to an it permits the manifestation of “the most 
extreme human authenticity.” It is literally down to the barest of bones. This 
skeletal shell is at once our prison and our last shelter- it is our last prison in 
that escape from its envelopment is not possible, yet it is our last shelter in 
that its embrace is all that is left of us. In the extreme events of aging and 
torture, we are reduced to pure body, alienated from our former self, yet 
closer to one’s true self. This dual experience of body as prison and shelter, 
felt as a form of both alienation and endearment is not fully realized until 
the first blow.  Améry contends:  
The Gestapo tortures. But that was a matter until now for the 
somebodies who were tortured and displayed their scars at 
antifascist conferences. That suddenly you yourself are the 
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Somebody, is grasped only with difficulty. That, too, is a kind of 
alienation.47  
That you are now the person being tortured, or that you are now the 
person who is aging is an occurrence that cannot be anticipated. The 
incredulity that you yourself are the Somebody experiencing such a 
phenomenon is met with ambiguity. The equivocality of the situation is 
illustrated in Améry ’s discussion of an aging woman who faithfully carries 
out her morning routine in front of a mirror. Her reflection is at once hers 
and not hers. Her face, that is becoming increasingly unrecognizable, no 
longer projects itself into a world that has expelled her. This retraction 
increases her inner sense of self until her routine in the mirror is experienced 
as a “narcissistic melancholy.”48 She becomes resigned to a situation that she 
cannot escape, yet continues her morning routine in an effort to preserve her 
former sense of self. She becomes closer to a body that she is no longer able 
to ignore. The youth are able to forget their bodies insofar as they act as 
mediators between them and the world. Their bodies, not yet subject to any 
border violation, can just be out there in the world. However, once the body 
feels something that it doesn’t want to feel, one is forced to acknowledge its 
separation from the world. This severance induces a breach of trust; Améry 
states that with the first blow, one loses “trust in the world.” Yet, before 
describing this dissociation from the world as resulting in a loss of trust, 
Améry summarily discusses whether what is felt is a loss of dignity. He 
states, 
Not much is said when someone who has never been beaten makes 
the ethical and pathetic statement that upon the first blow the 
prisoner loses his dignity. I must confess that I don’t know exactly 
what that is: human dignity. One person thinks he loses it when he 
finds himself in circumstances that make it impossible for him to 
take a daily bath. Another believes he loses it when he must speak 
to an official in something other than his native language.49 
Though Améry claims to not know what human dignity is, it is clear 
that he believes it to be an affair of ethics (ethical and pathetic statement). 
Insofar as he is trying to be merely descriptive of his experiences via an 
existential and phenomenological analysis, does he believe ethics has no 
place in his project? Is he only concerned with the recounting of embodied 
experiences and not the moral evaluation of them? What is noteworthy 
about his description of human dignity is its subjective quality (one person 
thinks…another person believes).  It is the subjective nature of one’s 
condition before the leap that interests Améry insofar as it resists 
intersubjective understanding. There is no universal “before the leap” 
experience, much like there is no agreed upon definition of human dignity.  
It is the incommunicability of one’s loss of dignity that interests me insofar 
as current debates on assisted suicide in France focus on comment mourir dans 
la dignité. That is, whether or not assisted suicide should be legalized 
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depends on whether or not such assistance would allow one to better die 
with dignity. La loi Leonetti and subsequent revisions promise “assistance 
médicalisée pour terminer sa vie dans la dignité,”50 yet do not allow aging 
persons access to “toute pastille létale qui permettrait une mort douce”. 
Being able to refuse therapeutic intervention, or opting to discontinue 
medical treatment are ways to preserve one’s dignity, while access to 
assisted suicide is deemed indignant. How is dignity being defined here? 
How can a law guarantee one’s right to die with dignity if such a concept 
resists universality? Is someone able to properly explain why their being 
allowed une mort douce via assisted suicide equates to dying with dignity? In 
his book Le fin mot de la vie: Contre le mal mourir en France, Le Guay views 
assisted suicide as a “soft barbaric” reply to the conditions of aging persons 
in France. As previously noted, he believes the French population is largely 
in favor of assisted suicide because of their fear of dying in hospitals. He 
states that one should not die alone, silenced in a hospital, but should be 
able to engage in a sort of “last dialogue” with others. He puts an emphasis 
on the importance of exchanging words at the end of one’s life, but if one 
truly wants to die, aren’t such thoughts ‘before the leap’ incommunicable? It 
is the failure of the subjective to be understood intersubjectively that is 
missing from current debates on assisted suicide in France.  As Améry 
makes clear in On Aging, the event of aging, the moving towards 
annihilation, is absurd and met with ambiguity as this new ego formation 
tries to reconcile with its former self. We cannot anticipate how we will react 
to the shift in balance between world and time that creates this reformulated 
ego. Furthermore, when we meet this occurrence, we won’t be able to make 
it accessible to the outside world, as we are only equipped with the language 
of idle talk that perpetuates the public space. The law in France tries to 
codify and rationally justify how to die with dignity, when the pure body 
confronting death resists reason.  How can France better respect the right of 
the person to die with dignity? Deschavanne and Tavoillot assert: 
L’ultime souhait de l’individu est de mourir en individu : ne pas se 
trouver, dès avant la mort, réduit à son corps, considéré comme un 
‘cadavre vivant’. La force des débats sur l’euthanasie, sur 
l’accompagnement des mourants le montrent. Tout comme 
d’ailleurs ceux sur le suicide des vieux. Si la question de l’entrée 
dans la vie s’est considérablement complexifiée, que dire de celle 
de la sortie? Nous oscillons là entre le fatalisme du ‘il n’y a plus 
rien à faire’ et l’illusion que la ‘science peut tout’, sans voir qu’entre 
la mort subie et la mort déniée, il y a une immense espace: celui de 
la mort aménagée.51 
They seem to believe that it is possible to die as an individual without being 
reduced to a state of pure body. What they label a “cadavre vivant”, Améry 
likens to “mortal remains”, yet these remains are both prison and last 
shelter. My reduction to pure body is me at my most individual insofar as I 
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retract from a world where my former ego was constructed through the eyes 
of others. This last shelter is me at my most authentic as it experiences an 
internalization of time. Deschavanne and Tavoillot call for a space between 
la mort subie and la mort deniée: la mort aménagée. They appeal to a politics of 
aging that takes into account the modern historical context in which people 
are aging. What does this arrangement of death look like? How can we 
newly adapt to our Being-towards-death?  
Though he offers no clear solutions, Améry’s existential and 
phenomenological account of aging, coupled with his critical analysis on 
suicide, offer important insights into how to better understand the current 
debate regarding assisted suicide in France. His notion of anticipatory 
imagination and its eventual failure in projecting extreme events such as 
aging adds a new element to thinking about future bioethics legislation. 
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